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SOME ANALOGIES FROM HISTORY’ 
N THE confident nineteenth century not the least of the I things of which we were confident was history. Indeed, 
in a sense that was the century of history; of the historical 
school in jurisprudence and politics and economics, of history 
of philosophy as philosophy, of evolution and embryology 
as history and historical method in biology. Where the cen- 
turies from the twelfth to  the sixteenth built on authority 
and the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries built on reason, 
the nineteenth century built on history. 
But if history stood for authority to  the last century, as 
a child of the Reformation it believed in private interpreta- 
tion of that  authority. “The  world,” said Emerson, “exists 
for the education of each man. . , . H e  must transfer the 
point of view from which history is commonly read, from 
Rome and Athens and London, to himself, and not deny his 
conviction that he is the court, and if Egypt o r  England 
have anything to  say to  him, he will try the case; if not let 
them forever be silent.” In other words, history was some- 
thing known, something given, and that absolute body of 
fact had authority, although the discovery of its meaning 
was for the individual reason of each human unit. Funda- 
mentally this point of view survived the philosophical revolu- 
tions of the era. In the Hegelian idealistic interpretation, 
any bit of history was a record of the unfolding of an idea 
in human experience, and that idea was but a phase or side 
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of a universal, an absolute idea. According to the positivist 
interpretation, which obtained in the latter part  of the cen- 
tury, a bit of history was a record of the evolution of insti- 
tutions by means of a certain inherent power of develop- 
ment whereby they became continuously and progressively 
better. 
Today all such interpretations are discounted. Hegel was 
the philosopher of history. Le t  him speak for  the century 
of history. H e  says: “God governs the world: T h e  actual 
working of his government-the carrying out of his plan- 
is the History of the World. This plan philosophy strives 
to  comprehend; for only that which has been developed as 
a result of it possesses bona fide reality. T h a t  which does not 
accord with it, is negative, worthless existence.” Perhaps 
Henry Ford  may speak for the present with his famous dic- 
tum that History is bunk. 
At any rate, there is general agreement that the philo- 
sophical interpretations of history in the last century merit 
Mr .  Ford’s epithet. At one pole are those who see in history 
not a discovery of the divine plan, but a product of struggles 
to satisfy economic wants. At the other are those who see a 
mere narrative of a unique series of single, unique events. 
Ideas are but instruments by which we organize or seek to  
organize disconnected, unrelated single events-all equally 
significant and equally insignificant. Evolution is but another 
word for change, and change may take place in all directions 
-not necessarily in a straight line forward and upward. 
Evolution is not invariably and inevitably a progress from 
organism or institution “A” in a straight line to  organism or 
institution “B”. I t  may be a converging development from 
organisms or institutions (‘C”, “D”, and “E”. Moreover, 
relativism now teaches us that there is no forward o r  up- 
ward. There  is only a welter of change, a succession of 
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unique single facts, which affords much harder lessons than 
those which Emerson urged, which each of us may string 
upon such theories as suit the exigencies of his argument for 
the time being. Such is the history which has displaced the 
confident and orderly body of teaching by which we set so 
much store in the last century. 
I n  the idealistic interpretations of history, it  was con- 
ceived that the historian, or a t  any rate the philosopher of 
history, could tell us whither we were going since history 
would reveal the course of unfolding of the idea which alone 
had reality. In like manner, in the positivist interpretations 
it was conceived that historian or philosopher of history 
could show us some par t  of the way we were going and 
point out the general direction of that way by discovering 
the laws of social and political and institutional evolution, 
whose inevitable and mechanical operation dictated all 
change and all development. 
I t  is significant, however, that the nineteenth-century inter- 
preters, whether idealist or positivist, demonstrated that we 
were going and could only go toward a more perfect form 
of the social, political, and economic order which obtained 
in that century. T h e  great main lines of social, political, and 
economic growth had been discovered once for all. I t  re- 
mained for  the rest of eternity to work out certain relatively 
unimportant details. A more perfect realization of the idea 
of freedom as the last century understood it, a more com- 
plete carrying out to its logical details of the rigime of 
freely competing self-sufficient individuals, a more thorough 
achieving of a social order in which the maximum of abstract 
individual self-assertion is deemed the highest good, such 
was the divine plan as revealed by history; such was the 
net result of the operation of inflexible laws of social devel- 
opment. Perhaps the over-confident assurance with which 
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the nineteenth century interpreted universal history in terms 
of itself has had much to  do  with discrediting historical in- 
terpretation in a present which cannot see itself in this pic- 
ture. 
Le t  us accept the proposition that  history does not repeat 
itself. Le t  us agree, if you like, that  things in time are unique 
and hence no item of human behavior is ever exactly like 
any other. Admitting that there is no straight line of prog- 
ress, and even, if you will, giving up the attractive hypothesis 
of evolution in a spiral, so that  while we never come back 
to  the past, yet we do go over the same ground on another 
plane-making all these concessions to the fashions of 
thought of the time, yet it remains that  we explain and 
understand new things, and make them usable for  human 
purposes, by the analogies of familiar old ones. Hence 
where we used to  talk of the lessons of history, we may still 
speak of some analogies from history. Certain comparisons 
with past eras, if they cannot tell us whither we are going, 
may still help us understand where we are. 
A marked characteristic of nineteenth-century interpreta- 
tions of history was preference for  certain periods of the 
historical past as vital and significant and fruitful of instruc- 
tion, while regarding others as a t  most negligible. I n  his 
essay on history Emerson says : “Every soul must know the 
whole lesson for  itself-must cover the whole ground. W h a t  
it does not see, what i t  does not live, it will not know.” Like- 
wise Hegel tells us that whatever does not accord with the 
historically revealed divine plan is simply worthless. Thus 
this worthless matter is par t  of the past, but is not par t  of 
history. T h e  divine plan is not revealed by the whole record 
of the past, but by selected parts of it. But what determines 
what parts reveal the divine plan, and what parts are to  be 
discarded as worthless? Does not the very proposition sug- 
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gest that the divine plan, as understood in the last century, 
did not come from history but was first injected into history 
and then extracted? Is the method of our philosopher of 
history different from that of the juggler who first puts an 
egg in his dummy’s hair, or his watch in the dummy’s pocket, 
and then draws it forth with an air of discovery? When we 
note that the periods of the past which reveal the divine 
plan are or may be made to appear analogous to the ideal 
which the last century had made for itself, when we note 
that the last century could see a picture of itself in some 
periods and not in others, we are justified in refusing to 
judge our time by the plan so discovered for us, and in 
hunting in the past independently for analogies more suited 
to our picture of ourselves. 
Let us recall what have been thought of as the great 
periods, as the eras of primary significance, from which 
the thinker could plot some part  of the course of evolution 
of civilization. Fo r  American purposes they used to  be the 
era of the city-states in Greece, with the rise of Macedon and 
establishment of Alexander’s empire as a tragic ending, the 
Roman republic with the establishment of the empire as a 
foreshadowing of the decline and fall that must go with the 
extinction of political liberty, the era of rising nationalism 
in western Europe after the Reformation, the Common- 
wealth, the Revolution of 1688, and the time of Whig  
supremacy in England, and the era of founding of new self- 
sufficient commonwealths in America. Much has been said 
deservedly in praise of these eras. I would not detract from 
them, if for no other reason, because I was brought up to  
reverence them. But one thing more remains to  be said of 
them which meant nothing to the last century, yet may mean 
much to us. They were, as one might say, eras of great 
small things, of activities of great potential significance car- 
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ried on in relatively small self-sufficient localities, of world- 
wide relations and achievements, not of organized men or 
organized mankind, but of individual men in and through 
small states. 
In contrast with these great periods of history, where- 
from we might learn something of the course of universal 
history, there were the negligible periods, making up much 
more than half of the story in point of time, and involving 
the lives and activities of many times more human beings, 
namely, the Hellenistic world, the Roman Empire, the By- 
zantine Empire, and the Middle Ages, of which the time 
from the twelfth to the end of the fifteenth century calls 
specially for our attention. 
Recall how these periods were thought of in the last cen- 
tury. Grote speaks of the Hellenistic era as “that gulf of 
Grecian nullity.” Finlay sees in it ((a sad spectacle of the 
debasing influence of wealth and power.’’ T h e  Roman em- 
pire from Augustus to the barbarian supremacy in the west, 
was the stock example of decadence or of degenerative evo- 
lution throughout the century of history. Of the Byzantine 
empire, Lecky says : “The  universal verdict of history is 
that it constitutes, without a single exception, the most 
thoroughly base and despicable form that civilization has 
yet assumed. . . . There has been no other enduring civili- 
zation so absolutely destitute of all the forms and elements 
of greatness, and none to  which the epithet mean may be so 
emphatically applied.” As to the Middle Ages, Hallam 
says : “This period, considered as to  the state of society, has 
been esteemed dark through ignorance and barbarous 
through poverty and want of refinement. And although this 
character is much less applicable to the last two centuries of 
the period than to those which preceded its commencement, 
yet we cannot expect t o  feel, in respect of ages a t  best imper- 
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fectly civilized and slowly progressive, that  interest which at- 
tends a more perfect development of human capacities and 
more brilliant advances in improvement. . . . W e  begin in 
darkness and calamity; and though the shadows grow fainter 
as we advance, yet we are to  break off our pursuit as the 
morning breathes upon us.” T h a t  is, we are in darkness to  
the morning of the Reformation. 
“By my troth,” said Mistress Quickly, “these are very bit- 
ter words.” 
As to the Middle Ages, men began to feel uneasy about 
this judgment of them a good while ago. Fo r  certain pur- 
poses of institutional history, the theory of history as the 
unfolding of the idea compelled jurists and students of pol- 
itics to  look into those times. It was conceived that we might 
find in them the simplest forms of modern institutions and 
thus identify the idea which had been unfolding in their de- 
velopment. But beyond this, it  was long held unprofitable to 
spend much time or labor on that benighted era. As to  the 
Hellenistic world, the Roman empire after the first Caesars, 
and the Byzantine empire, it has remained for the present 
generation to  find worth in them. They did not accord with 
the picture of nineteenth-century society, in the image of 
which the century of history wrought. 
W h a t  have the eras which were deemed historically worth 
while in common? W h a t  was seen in the Greek city-states, in 
republican Rome, and in western civilization from the Re- 
formation to the latter part  of the nineteenth century which 
gave them historical value ? W h a t  have the supposedly neg- 
ligible eras in common? W h a t  was seen in the Hellenistic 
era, in the Roman empire, in the Byzantine empire which 
seemed to  deprive them of historical value? Chiefly the 
former were capable of interpretation as individualist. They  
had the appearance of eras of freedom while the latter ap- 
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peared eras of political subjection. Also western Europe 
af ter  the Reformation was nationalist and had faith in the 
local as contrasted with the universal. T h e  ideas of world 
unity in the Hellenistic era, of a world empire in imperial 
Rome and Constantinople, and of universal spiritual and 
temporal authority in the Middle Ages, were alien to  the 
spirit of the century of history. Finally, and not the least, on 
the one hand we have eras of comparative simplicity of social 
organization and of life, on the other hand eras of compara- 
tive luxury and complexity. T rue  this distinction is not easy 
to  maintain for  the case of the Middle Ages. Yet the luxury 
of ecclesiastical foundations, as compared with the relative 
poverty of religious societies after the Reformation, and the 
high degree of economic organization of a feudal society, as 
compared with the rdgime of freely competing individuals 
each carving out his own place in the economic order, sufficed 
to  put that era on the philosophical historian’s index. 
In  the world of today, beneath the surface a t  any rate, in 
law and in politics the cult of the local is giving way to  a re- 
vived faith in the universal. T h e  self-sufficient individual is 
being replaced by the individual in relation. T h e  rSgime of 
free competitive self-assertion is being supplanted by one of 
cooperation. It it not to be wondered a t  that  men begin to  
feel there were other great eras than those which had been 
recognized from the Reformation to  the end of the nine- 
teenth century. I t  is not to  be wondered a t  that  men begin to  
see great things, o r  a t  any rate things worthy of study and 
reflection and capable of better uses than as horrible ex- 
amples, in Hellenistic civilization, in the Roman empire from 
Tra jan  to  Diocletian, in the Byzantine empire and in the 
Middle Ages. 
Certain analogies of the present to  the Hellenistic era are 
obvious. There  has been a diffusion of western European 
360 Commencement Address 
civilization over the world as then there had been a diffusion 
of Greek civilization. New centers of wealth and population 
had sprung up and taken the leadership from the Greek city- 
states. One might well compare the relation of New York 
and Chicago to  Europe with that of Alexandria and Antioch 
to Greece. In  respect of culture and a r t  and libraries and 
museums as well as in respect of wealth and population, the 
parallel is suggestive. I t  is suggestive in respect of the migra- 
tion of books and works of art. I t  is suggestive in respect of 
the dispersion of races and peoples. I t  is suggestive in respect 
of the relative economic position of the old and the new 
world. Europe of today, unstable politically and in straits 
financially, may well be compared with Greece, wasting by 
internal strife after the Peloponnesian war, decaying both in 
its political and in its economic order. 
There  are no less striking analogies between the present 
and the era of imperial Rome. Then, as now, there had been 
world-wide economic unification through improved transpor- 
tation. Then, as now, an urban industrial society had re- 
placed a rural agricultural society. Then, as now, cities had 
grown and were growing a t  the expense of country. Then, 
as now, great urban centers were replacing a multitude of 
local municipalities in agricultural communities. Moreover, 
the strengthening of executive authority throughout the 
world and the rise of delegated legislation suggest a t  once 
the devolutions of political power which in time turned the 
first citizen of a republic into an absolute monarch. When 
the Supreme Court of the United States is willing to hold 
that Congress may leave the final interpretation of a statute 
to  an administrative officer and that his interpretation is 
binding on the courts, we are coming to something very like 
a Roman lex regia. Indeed, the reasons given by Chief Jus- 
tice White for upholding the exercise by the Interstate Com- 
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merce Commission of what had always been considered 
legislative powers are substantially those given in Justinian’s 
Institutes for the devolution of legislative powers upon the 
Roman emperor. Explaining Chief Justice White’s opinion, 
Chief Justice T a f t  says : “The  utter inability of Congress to 
give the time and attention indispensable to  these powers in 
detail forced the modification of the rule.” Justinian tells us 
that lawmaking power passed from the Roman people be- 
cause the electorate had become “so increased that it was 
difficult to assemble it together for the purpose of enacting 
statutes,’’ Economic unifications, mixture of races, complex- 
ity of social and economic organization, diffusion of luxury 
and wealth, accumulation of huge populations of workers in 
great centers, and a general condition of bigness and com- 
plexity ally us to the Roman empire rather than to the 
Roman republic. 
Interest in the Byzantine empire has grown steadily in the 
present century. Men have been saying that an empire which 
stood strong for nine centuries and fought an obstinate rear- 
guard fight for  two more, which put the Roman law in its 
final form, which built St. Sophia and gave the world a type 
of church architecture which has stood for all subsequent 
time, which preserved Roman administration and Greek cul- 
ture and gave impetus to  the revival of learning in the West, 
whose coinage was the greater part  of the portable wealth 
of Europe in the Middle Ages-that such an empire could 
not have been so utterly decadent, so utterly mean after all. 
From the discovery of the new world and the Reforma- 
tion, from which we date the modern world, the emphasis 
has been on change. Social control by organization gave way 
to economic control through competition. Where the prob- 
lem had been to keep men in their appointed grooves, it  be- 
came one of setting them free to  make and remake new 
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grooves for themselves. T h e  Reformation, the Puritan 
Revolution, the rise of the Whigs and English Revolution of 
168 8, the American Revolution, the French Revolution-five 
great revolutions in three hundred years, or one in every 
other generation-made political instability seem the rule, 
and the political interpretation of history identified this in- 
stability with progress. Stability of institutions was held to  
be stagnation. But now that pioneering has been done, now 
that those who are in distress and those who are in debt and 
those who are discontented cannot find a convenient Adullam 
a t  hand in an adjacent wilderness, now that we have to  find 
how to  live together in crowded communities, from which we 
cannot withdraw to set up new ones of our own, stability is 
something sought for. T h e  example of an empire which 
stood for eleven centuries, in which three-fourths of the em- 
perors ascended the throne in the orderly process of govern- 
ment, and the greater part of the usurpers followed each 
other over short periods in temporary interludes in the 
peaceful workings of a stable system-such an example calls 
upon us to look into it. When we look into it we see that the 
problem of an ordered society was a t  least met by a balance 
of free individual self-assertion and the general security 
which endured for centuries. 
Chiefly, however, the Middle Ages attract and deserve at- 
tention as furnishing significant analogies. 
Recall the broad lines of feudal organization of society. 
I t  rested on relations and duties, not on isolated individuals 
and rights. Every one, no matter how great or how small, 
was in a relation to some one else and the relation involved 
reciprocal duties. T h e  original fundamental idea was co- 
operation in defense. In the turmoil following the downfall 
of the Roman empire in the west, the single individual had 
not proved equal to defending himself. Hence he was not 
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thought of as self-sufficient. In  the beginning he commended 
himself to some lord, that  is, he surrendered his land to  some 
lord who gave him an estate in it. Thus the lord owed him 
protection and he owed the lord service. T h e  typical man 
did not compete. H e  had his place in a cooperative organiza- 
tion. T h e  several economic activities, in such division of 
labor as obtained in a mediaeval community, were conceived 
as services. T h e  services required by the feudal community 
in which one held his estate were thought of as services due 
the lord, who had reciprocal duties whereby they inured to 
the community. Every man was held in his place by duty of 
service instead of by pressure of competition. H e  found his 
greatness in the greatness of his lord, not in competitive 
achievement. H e  did not own the things which counted in 
the social order of the time: he held estates in them. Thus  
whoever owned anything of consequence for that very reason 
stood in a relation. Estate and relation, relation and recipro- 
cal duties were inseparable. T h e  emphasis was on duties, not 
on rights. T h e  watchword was cooperation. T h e  significant 
thing was relation, with duties of doing the several things 
which the community required resting on those who had in- 
terests to which those duties were attached. I t  was not what 
men undertook from self-interest or caprice that maintained 
the social and economic order. Men were held to  what their 
position in the relationally organized society made it their 
duty to  do. 
Turn  now to our orthodox picture of society. I t  is one 
which has governed from the sixteenth to  the nineteenth cen- 
tury, getting what is likely to  prove its final form in the lat- 
ter. It is a picture in which relation is ignored and each man 
is made to  stand out by himself as an economically, polit- 
ically, and hence legally self-sufficient unit. H e  is to find his 
place by free competition. T h e  highest good is the maximum 
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of free self-assertion on the part  of these units. T h e  signifi- 
cant feature of these units is their natural rights by virtue 
of which they ought to have certain things or be free to do 
certain things. T h e  end of government and law is to  secure 
these natural rights, to give the fullest and freest rein to  the 
competitive acquisitory activities of these units, to  order the 
competition with a minimum of interference. 
When such a picture truly portrayed the social order, 
when each household was economically independent, when 
each neighborhood performed within itself the main func- 
tions called for by such division of labor as a rural agricul- 
tural society demanded, a relationally organized society had 
no vital interest for the student of law or politics. But the 
days when the local miller ground the flour for the local com- 
munity from the grain grown by the local farmer, and this 
flour was baked by the local baker and the local housewives, 
are hardly even remembered in our great urban communities 
and are passing in their last rural strongholds. T h e  days 
when the local butcher provided the local meat from animals 
sold him by the local farmers, and the hides were tanned by 
the local tanner and made into shoes for his local customers 
by the local cobbler, are utterly gone. Gone, too, are the days 
when the local founder provided materials for the local 
blacksmith, and the local carriagemaker made the local vehi- 
cles. These days of local economic self-sufficiency are wholly 
in the past. Hence the individual can no longer do  single- 
handed the aggregate of things demanded for his own life by 
the minute division of labor in a complex economic organiza- 
tion. T h e  situation created by the economic order of today is 
analogous to  that presented by the social order when the in- 
dividual land owner, unequal to  protecting himself, entered 
into a relation of service and protection with a lord. For the 
days when the individual business man was self-sufficient are 
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also in the past. More  and more he has had to  commend 
himself by transferring his business to a corporation and 
taking shares in its stead. 
In  our present economic order business and industry are 
the significant activities. They stand toward the social order 
of today where landholding stood toward the social order of 
the Middle Ages. Every one in business, great o r  small, is in 
a shareholder relation in which things are due him as share- 
holder, not because of any special undertaking. H e  is not 
freely competing. T h e  great bulk of any urban community 
are  upon salaries and owe service to  corporations, which of 
late have shown some consciousness of owing a reciprocal 
protection. T h e  individual businesses are more and more 
giving up and going into corporate form. T h e  corporations 
are more and more merging. Chain stores are  bringing 
about something very like a feudal organization of businesses 
which until now had been able to exist on the older basis. If 
a new domain of business or industry is opened, those who 
have conquered it distribute stock as a great feudal lord dis- 
tributed estates. It has come to  be the general course that 
men do not own businesses or  enterprises or  industries. They  
hold shares in them. 
Today the typical men ( for  the city dweller, not the 
farmer, is the type for  this time) finds his greatness, not in 
himself and in what he does, but in the corporation which he 
serves. If he is great, he is published to the world not as 
having done this or  that, but as director in this company or 
that. If he is small, yet he shines in the reflected glory of the 
corporation from which he draws a salary. 
But the significant thing is to contrast the feudal self- 
sufficient community with the individualist self-sufficient man, 
and then contrast the latter, as he had a real existence in the 
pioneer, rural, agricultural society of nineteenth-century 
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America, with the employee, shareholder, investor of today, 
held a t  least in one and often in many relations, with shares 
o r  interests rather than ownership in the things which count, 
cooperating rather than competing, finding his satisfactions 
in the achievements toward which he contributes rather than 
in what he achieves of himself. No one could suppose that 
we shall ever return exactly to a feudal organization of 
society. But we do  seem to  be developing a relationally or- 
ganized society. Our picture can no longer be one of free 
competitive activity of economically self-sufficing units. It 
must be redrawn as one of adjusted relations of economically 
interdependent units. Our watchword is not competition but 
cooperation. All this is much more nearly allied to the Mid- 
dle Ages than to the era from the Reformation to the 
nineteenth century. 
There  is no absolute history. The re  is no absolute meas- 
ure of historical values. Values are relative to  problems and 
tasks of the time and place. Where the Greek city-state and 
the feudal rdgime saw organization values, the seventeenth, 
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries saw personality values. 
Today  social and legal philosophies are seeking to  transcend 
both and are in quest of civilization values. As they give over 
esteeming free individual self-assertion as the highest good, 
types of civilization which the last century ignored take on 
a new importance. 
A generation ago such comparisons of the present with 
these eras would have seemed prophecies of despair, admis- 
sions of conscious decadence, resigned acceptings of decline. 
But as we change gradually to another economic and social 
and hence political order and thus are able better to under- 
stand these eras of another type, we may see that much de- 
pends on the measure by which they are judged. They  do  not 
fare well by the measure of a rural agricultural society of 
small towns in a time of self-sufficient small states in an era 
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of competitive individual acquisitory self-assertion. On the 
other hand, the institutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the bills of rights and dogma of separation of 
powers and aversion to  administration and reliance upon 
rules rather than on men, and the modes of political thought 
of Victorian liberalism, do  not fare well by the measure of 
the urban industrial order of today, by the measure of life in 
metropolitan cities in a time of organization, relation, and 
cooperation. Where the nineteenth-century small-town in- 
dividualist held that each man was the tribunal to  try history, 
we may perhaps be saying in the twentieth century that each 
time must value other times by its own measure and for its 
own ends. 
To say that history is the tribunal of the world assumes 
history as something given. The re  is no one tribunal of his- 
tory. There  are as many as there are times and economic and 
social orders with their diverse problems. T h e  last of these 
tribunals for the time being may very well, indeed it usually 
does, reverse the judgments of the tribunals which had gone 
before it. If man may not live by bread alone, neither may 
he live without bread. Material civilizations are not to  be 
despised and will not be in an age of material progress. 
There  are two sides to  civilization, mastery of external 
nature and mastery of human nature. Relativism does a 
service in bringing home to  us that one of these sides is not 
absolutely higher or absolutely more praiseworthy than the 
other. I t  is a matter of selection and interpretation and 
emphasis to  construct and apply any measure of values. All 
types of human activity are involved in maintaining, further- 
ing and transmitting civilization. T h e  sum of all of them 
goes to  make up civilization. W e  are not bound forever to  
value human experience, we are not bound now to  value our 
own time, in terms of the last half of the last century. 
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